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Sued If You Do, Sued If You Don’t: Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act as a Defense to
Race-Conscious Districting
Caroline A. Wong†
INTRODUCTION
Suppose that you work on a state legislative committee
charged with drafting maps of your state’s electoral districts.
Recently, constituents have contacted their representatives in
the legislature to complain that the current district lines significantly dilute the influence of minority votes in some areas of the
state. The constituents demand a change and warn that, in the
event that no change is made, they will bring a lawsuit against
the state under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 1 After studying the relevant law, your committee agrees that the current
district plan may contravene § 2, which prohibits states from
adopting plans that result in minority-vote dilution. 2 To avoid
litigation, your committee decides to draft a new district plan to
remedy the § 2 violation. In choosing a strategy for drafting the
remedial plan, your committee decides that it must account for
racial demographics. After all, a strictly race-neutral methodology might fail to effectively correct the § 2 violation, or it might
inadvertently give rise to a separate § 2 violation in another part
of the state. 3
But pursuing a race-conscious approach may be no better
than jumping out of the frying pan and into the fire. 4 The prob† BM 2012, Indiana University–Bloomington; JD Candidate 2016, The University
of Chicago Law School.
1
Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437, 437, codified as amended at 52 USCA § 10301
(West 2014).
2
52 USCA § 10301. See also Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 46–51 (1986).
3
Section 2 liability attaches whenever a state’s district plan results in vote dilution, regardless of whether state actors intended to dilute votes or consciously considered
racial demographics when drafting the plan. See Gingles, 478 US at 43–44.
4
Consider Laurentius Abstemius, The Fishes and the Frying Pan, in Roger
L’Estrange, ed, Fables of Aesop and Other Eminent Mythologists: With Morals and Reflexions 289 (printed for Sare, et al, 5th ed 1708) (“A Cook was Frying a Dish of Live
Fish, and so soon as ever they felt the Heat of the Pan. There’s no Enduring of This, cry’d
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lem is that while race-conscious remedial districting may avert
litigation over a § 2 violation, it simultaneously opens the door
to a lawsuit in which the remedial plan may be challenged as an
unconstitutional racial classification under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 5 A state that finds itself
in potential violation of § 2 is thus placed in a seemingly “impossible position.” 6 Whether it decides to forgo or pursue raceconscious remedial districting, the state leaves itself exposed to
liability for violating either § 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the
Equal Protection Clause, respectively.
In an effort to resolve this predicament, a few states have
responded to equal protection racial gerrymandering challenges
by arguing that compliance with § 2 constitutes an affirmative
defense against claims of race-conscious districting. Whether
such a § 2 defense is legally cognizable, however, is a question
that remains unresolved. Both times that the issue of the defense’s viability has been raised before the United States Supreme Court, the justices have expressly declined to address it.7
As a result, state governments—as well as courts 8 and districting-litigation plaintiffs 9—have been left without answers to critical questions about the extent to which § 2 requires, justifies, or
forbids the incorporation of race-conscious principles in the design of electoral districts. Thus, on the question whether § 2 necessitates or permits race-conscious districting, Solicitor General
one, and so they all Leapt into the Fire; and instead of Mending the Matter, they were
Worse now than Before.”).
5
US Const Amend XIV, § 2. See also, for example, Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900,
917, 928 (1995) (striking down a district plan under the Equal Protection Clause on the
grounds that race had been the predominant factor motivating the plan’s design).
6
League of United Latin American Citizens v Perry, 548 US 399, 518 (2006) (Scalia concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing the dilemma that a state faces when it must choose between compliance with the Voting Rights
Act and compliance with the Equal Protection Clause).
7
See Shaw v Hunt, 517 US 899, 915 (1996); Bush v Vera, 517 US 952, 977 (1996)
(O’Connor) (plurality).
8
When a court strikes down a state’s district plan, it may become responsible for
redrawing that state’s district lines by judicial order. In fulfilling that responsibility,
courts have a direct interest in knowing the extent to which § 2 requires or permits raceconscious districting, because courts too must avoid redistricting in a manner that violates the Voting Rights Act or the Equal Protection Clause. See Abrams v Johnson, 521
US 74, 79 (1997), citing Upham v Seamon, 456 US 37, 43 (1982).
9
Districting-litigation plaintiffs sometimes propose remedial district plans for
adoption by court order; thus, they also have an interest in the resolution of these issues.
See, for example, Georgia State Conference of the NAACP v Fayette County Board of
Commissioners, 950 F Supp 2d 1294, 1303 (ND Ga 2013) (questioning the extent to
which the plaintiffs’ proposed remedial district plan could permissibly account for race).
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Andrew Brasher spoke for many when he confessed during oral
argument in a recent racial gerrymandering case: “I really honestly do not know how Section 2 would necessarily apply.” 10
Given the frequency of districting litigation, 11 questions
about the proper application of § 2 demand resolution. This
Comment endeavors to answer those questions. Part I canvasses
the legislative history of § 2 and overviews the doctrinal framework governing federal claims of vote dilution and racial gerrymandering. Part II examines the various attempts that states
have made to raise the § 2 defense in response to racial gerrymandering and state constitutional claims. Finally, Part III argues that § 2 indeed offers a legally cognizable defense against
claims of racial districting, for doctrinal and normative reasons.
It then envisages how courts could apply the § 2 defense in a
way that would benefit states raising the defense in good faith
but filter out states merely seeking to evade liability for unjustifiable race-based action. In light of the defense’s application in
the contexts of vote dilution and racial gerrymandering, Part III
also explains that states might avoid violations of both § 2 and
the Equal Protection Clause by creating racially integrated coalitional districts.
I. SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND RACIALDISTRICTING CLAIMS
Hailed on the day of its enactment as “a triumph for freedom,” 12 the Voting Rights Act of 1965 13 has indelibly remolded
the election-law landscape over the past five decades. Section 2
of the Act, aimed at dismantling racially discriminatory state
voting practices, has become the font of a robust and complex
body of law governing electoral districting. Proceeding in two
10 Transcript of Oral Argument, Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v Alabama,
Docket No 13-895, *60 (US Nov 12, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 5844290).
11 As of January 1, 2015, redistricting in the wake of the 2010 US Census has
prompted districting litigation in forty-two of the fifty states, including racial-districting
litigation in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and
Wisconsin. For a database collecting information about this litigation, see generally Litigation in the 2010 Cycle (Loyola Law School–Los Angeles), archived at
http://perma.cc/YJ4S-RYXV (tracking the proceedings of districting litigation nationwide).
12 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda at the Signing of
the Voting Rights Act, 1965 Pub Papers 840, 840.
13 Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437, codified as amended at 52 USCA § 10101 et seq
(West 2014).
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sections, this Part begins by situating the Voting Rights Act
within the context of the civil rights movement and overviewing
the legislative history of § 2. It then surveys the development of
case law concerning federal racial-districting claims under both
§ 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 14
A. The Background and Legislative History of § 2
In the United States, voting rights have often been closely
intertwined with issues of race. The right to vote free of racebased restrictions became constitutionalized in 1870 by the Fifteenth Amendment, 15 the ratification of which was driven in
part by the need to protect African Americans’ voting rights in
the wake of the Civil War. 16 Later voting-rights legislation was
enacted concurrently with the development of the African American civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s. 17 The Voting
Rights Act of 1965 itself arose directly from the advocacy efforts
of civil rights activists 18 and aimed to dislodge state voting practices that tended to disenfranchise minority voters, such as literacy tests and poll taxes. 19
Section 2 is the centerpiece of the Voting Rights Act. In its
originally enacted version, § 2 prohibited states from imposing
any “standard, practice or procedure . . . to deny or abridge the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color.” 20 This language closely tracked that of the Fifteenth Amendment, which broadly decrees that “[t]he right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or

14 Throughout this Comment, the term “racial-districting claims” is used to refer
broadly to all claims that challenge districts as racially discriminatory, whether premised on § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the Equal Protection Clause, or both.
15 US Const Amend XV, § 1.
16 See Emma C. Jordan, The Future of the Fifteenth Amendment, 28 Howard L J
541, 546–48 (1985).
17 See Civil Rights Act of 1957 § 131, Pub L No 85-315, 71 Stat 634, 637–38, codified as amended at 52 USCA § 10101 et seq (West 2014); Civil Rights Act of 1960 § 601,
Pub L No 86-449, 74 Stat 86, 90–92, codified as amended at 52 USCA § 10101 et seq
(West 2014). For a comprehensive historical account of the African American civil rights
movement, see generally Peter B. Levy, The Civil Rights Movement (Greenwood 1998).
18 See Gary May, Bending toward Justice: The Voting Rights Act and the Transformation of American Democracy 48, 148 (Basic Books 2013).
19 See Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U Chi L Rev 1493, 1496–98 (2008).
20 Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 79 Stat at 437.
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abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” 21
In the first two decades after its enactment, disenfranchised
plaintiffs rarely relied on § 2. 22 Instead, voting-rights cases during that period were almost always brought under the Reconstruction Amendments or under alternative provisions of the
Voting Rights Act. 23 But the tides began to turn in 1980 when
the Supreme Court heard its first § 2 vote dilution case—City of
Mobile, Alabama v Bolden 24—and issued a decision that threatened to severely restrain the potential strength of § 2’s protections. In Bolden, a plurality of the justices held that because
§ 2’s language “no more than elaborate[d] upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment,” 25 a plaintiff could establish a § 2 violation
only by proving that a state had adopted a given voting practice
with an intent to discriminate on the basis of race. 26 Requiring
proof of such intent placed an enormous burden on plaintiffs
seeking to challenge voting practices as racially discriminatory,
and this aspect of Bolden accordingly garnered “a firestorm of
criticism and protest in the legal community.” 27
In reaction to Bolden, Congress amended § 2 to prohibit the
use of any “standard, practice, or procedure . . . which results in
a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race,” thereby abrogating Bolden’s
intent requirement and bolstering the robustness of § 2’s protections. 28 Congress’s post-Bolden amendments further specify that
state practices may not cause racial minorities to have “less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice,”
and the amendments also instruct courts to employ a totality-ofUS Const Amend XV, § 1.
See Cox and Miles, 75 U Chi L Rev at 1497 (cited in note 19).
23 See id. See also, for example, Allen v State Board of Elections, 393 US 544, 553–
54 (1969) (involving voting-rights claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment and
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
24 446 US 55 (1980).
25 Id at 60 (Stewart) (plurality).
26 Id at 60–62 (Stewart) (plurality).
27 Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in
Chandler Davidson, ed, Minority Vote Dilution 85, 100–01 (Howard 1989). See also Voting Rights Act Extension, S Rep No 97-417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 16 (1982), reprinted in
1982 USCCAN 177, 196 (denouncing the Court’s decision in Bolden for “plac[ing] an unacceptably difficult burden on plaintiffs”).
28 Act of 1982 § 3, Pub L No 97-205, 96 Stat 131, 134, codified at 52 USCA § 10301
(West 2014) (emphasis added).
21
22
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the-circumstances test to ascertain whether a given state practice violates § 2. 29 As demonstrated in the next Section, racialdistricting litigation under § 2 has proliferated widely since the
addition of these amendments.
B. Bringing a Racial-Districting Claim: The Prima Facie Case
Under federal law, a plaintiff has two avenues for challenging a state’s district plan as racially discriminatory. First, she
can bring suit under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act and allege that
the plan results in the unlawful dilution of minority votes. 30 Second, she can bring suit under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause and allege that the plan is an unconstitutional gerrymander designed predominantly on the basis of
racial considerations. 31 The legal regimes governing each of these claims are “analytically distinct” 32 and are discussed in turn
in this Section.
1. Vote dilution claims under § 2.
To establish a prima facie case of minority-vote dilution under § 2, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the relevant minority
group is “sufficiently large and geographically compact” to feasibly constitute a numerical majority of the citizen voting-age
population in a single-member legislative district; (2) the minority group is “politically cohesive”; and (3) the majority group in
the relevant geographic region “votes sufficiently as a bloc” to
defeat the minority group’s preferred political candidates. 33
29 Act of 1982 § 3, 96 Stat at 134. The amendments also clarify, however, that § 2
does not require states to ensure that minority candidates are elected in numbers proportional to their states’ minority populations. Act of 1982 § 3, 96 Stat at 134.
30 See, for example, Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 34–35 (1986).
31 See, for example, Hunt v Cromartie, 526 US 541, 543 (1999). In theory, plaintiffs
also have the option of using the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for constitutional
vote dilution claims. See Rogers v Lodge, 458 US 613, 617, 627 (1982) (affirming the district court’s finding that a challenged district plan diluted minority votes in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment). Such claims, however, have historically been unsuccessful
and have largely fallen out of fashion since 1982, when Congress broadened the scope of
§ 2 in response to Bolden. See, for example, White v Regester, 412 US 755, 763 (1973) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment vote dilution claim); Whitcomb v Davis,
403 US 124, 157–60 (1971) (same).
32 Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630, 652 (1993) (“Shaw I”).
33 Gingles, 478 US at 50–51, 63. See also Bartlett v Strickland, 556 US 1, 14, 18–19
(2009) (Kennedy) (plurality) (clarifying that a “numerical majority” is defined as 50 percent or more of the citizen voting-age population in the relevant geographic area for purposes of the first of these three requirements).
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Nicknamed “the Gingles preconditions” after the seminal case
Thornburg v Gingles, 34 these three evidentiary requirements
speak to causation; without them, minority voters cannot show
that a challenged district plan “result[ed] in . . . abridgement”35
of their right to vote within the meaning of § 2. 36
After establishing the Gingles preconditions, a plaintiff
must also demonstrate that the totality of the circumstances
substantiates the alleged dilutive effects of the challenged
plan. 37 In weighing the totality of the circumstances, courts typically consider the seven factors set forth by the Senate Judiciary
Committee in a report accompanying the post-Bolden amendments to § 2: (1) the history of discriminatory voting-related
practices in the relevant state; (2) whether voting in the state is
“racially polarized”; (3) whether the state has used “voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group”; (4) whether minorities
have been denied access to “candidate slating process[es]”;
(5) whether minorities “bear the effects of [past] discrimination
in such areas as education, employment, and health”;
(6) whether political campaigns in the state make “racial appeals”; and (7) whether minorities “have been elected to public
office in the jurisdiction.” 38 The Senate report also lists two other
factors of secondary significance: whether elected officials in the
state tend to be unresponsive to “the particularized needs” of
minority groups, and whether the policies offered to justify the
state’s allegedly discriminatory voting practices are “tenuous.” 39
478 US 30 (1986).
52 USCA § 10301(a).
36 See Gingles, 478 US at 50 n 17 (“Unless minority voters possess the potential to
elect representatives in the absence of the challenged structure of practice, they cannot
claim to have been injured by that structure or practice.”) (emphasis omitted).
37 See Johnson v De Grandy, 512 US 997, 1010–12 (1994); Voinovich v Quilter, 507
US 146, 157 (1993). See also 52 USCA § 10301(b) (providing that a § 2 violation is established if it is shown by a “totality of the circumstances” that “members of a [racial] class
of citizens . . . have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate
in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice”).
38 Gingles, 478 US at 36–37, quoting S Rep No 97-417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess at 28–29
(cited in note 27).
39 Gingles, 478 US at 37, quoting S Rep No 97-417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess at 29 (cited
in note 27). In sum, the totality-of-the-circumstances test grants judges significant analytical flexibility and has the potential to vary widely in application from court to court.
One empirical study indicates that the precise manner in which a judge assesses the totality of the circumstances in this context may depend heavily on his or her individual
political ideology or race. See Cox and Miles, 75 U Chi L Rev at 1519–24, 1535–36 (cited
in note 19).
34
35
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Several different legal theories are available to a plaintiff
seeking to bring a vote dilution claim. In particular, three distinct theories of vote dilution have emerged from the case law:
vote subsumption, vote fragmentation, and vote packing. Discussed in turn below, each theory of vote dilution has been at issue in at least one case arising before the Supreme Court in recent decades.
a) Vote subsumption. One of the earliest forms of vote dilution recognized by the Supreme Court, vote subsumption occurs when a state draws a large multimember legislative district
as an alternative to smaller single-member districts in a way
that ensures that minority voters in the relevant geographic area will remain a politically weak demographic. 40 The designation
of an electoral district as “multimember” or “single-member” refers to the number of representatives that are elected at large
from within the district. 41 In particular, a multimember district
employs a system by which several members of the legislature
are elected simultaneously, whereas a single-member district
involves a voting scheme in which only one legislative representative is elected from the district. 42 Accordingly, a multimember district can engender minority-vote dilution whenever
it is large enough to overwhelm the voting preferences of small
minority communities that would have otherwise held politically
influential majorities or pluralities in a system of single-member
districts.
Gingles itself involved allegations of vote subsumption. The
plaintiffs challenged six multimember state-legislative districts
in North Carolina as precipitating this type of vote dilution in
violation of § 2. 43 The plaintiffs argued that the state’s “decision
to employ multimember, rather than single-member, districts in
the contested jurisdictions dilute[d] [African American] votes by
submerging them in a white majority, thus impairing [the plaintiffs’] ability to elect representatives of their choice.” 44 After formulating the three preconditions that would thereafter govern
all § 2 vote dilution claims, the Court reviewed the district
court’s factual findings for clear error and concluded that the
See Gingles, 478 US at 46.
See John F. Banzhaf III, Multi-member Electoral Districts—Do They Violate the
“One Man, One Vote” Principle, 75 Yale L J 1309, 1309 (1966).
42 See Douglas J. Amy, Behind the Ballot Box: A Citizen’s Guide to Voting Systems
67–68 (Praeger 2000).
43 Gingles, 478 US at 34–35.
44 Id at 46.
40
41
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challenged districts resulted in unlawful vote dilution. 45 The application of the three Gingles preconditions, however, has since
been expanded beyond the vote-subsumption context and transported into the Court’s analyses of vote-fragmentation and votepacking claims as well.
b) Vote fragmentation. A district plan can also effect vote
dilution by carving a geographically compact minority community into two or more fragments and then allocating those fragments across multiple districts, whether multimember or single
member. 46 The dilutive mechanism of such vote fragmentation is
similar to that of vote subsumption: both submerge racial minorities within electoral districts in a way that prevents their voting preferences from meaningfully influencing political processes. Colloquially, vote fragmentation has been termed “cracking,”
which the Supreme Court has defined as “the splitting of a
group or party among several districts to deny that group or
party a majority in any of those districts.” 47
The first Supreme Court cases to apply the Gingles framework to vote-fragmentation claims were Growe v Emison 48 and
Johnson v De Grandy. 49 In Emison, the plaintiffs alleged that
congressional and state-legislative districts in Minneapolis had
diluted minority votes by “needlessly fragment[ing] two Indian
reservations and divid[ing] the minority population of Minneapolis” when the members of that minority population could have
instead been grouped into a single, cohesive district. 50 Similarly,
in De Grandy, black and Hispanic voters challenged a Florida
district plan on the grounds that it “unlawfully fragment[ed] cohesive minority communities” in the Miami-Dade County area
into separate single-member districts. 51 Though both the Emison
and De Grandy plaintiffs prevailed in their respective district
courts, 52 the Supreme Court rejected both sets of claims. In
Id at 80.
See, for example, League of United Latin American Citizens v Perry, 548 US 399,
423–27 (2006); Growe v Emison, 507 US 25, 28 (1993); De Grandy, 512 US at 1000–02.
47 Vieth v Jubelirer, 541 US 267, 286 n 7 (2004) (Scalia) (plurality).
48 507 US 25 (1993).
49 512 US 997 (1994).
50 Emison, 507 US at 28.
51 De Grandy, 512 US at 1000–02 (quotation marks omitted).
52 See Emison v Growe, 782 F Supp 427, 439–40, 448 (D Minn 1992) (three-judge
panel), revd and remd, Growe v Emison, 507 US 25 (1993); De Grandy v Wetherell, 815 F
Supp 1550, 1574, 1580 (ND Fla 1992) (three-judge panel), affd in part and revd in part,
Johnson v De Grandy, 512 US 997 (1994). Federal circuit court precedent in this area of
law is relatively scarce because cases involving challenges to electoral districts may be
45
46
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Emison, the Court held that the district court had clearly erred
in finding that the second and third Gingles preconditions had
been satisfied, because the record “contain[ed] no statistical evidence of minority political cohesion . . . or of majority bloc voting.” 53 Likewise, in De Grandy, the Court avoided a conclusive
analysis of the three Gingles preconditions but held that the totality-of-the-circumstances factors weighed in the state’s favor.54
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied chiefly on minority
voters’ documented ability to form effective voting majorities in
numbers roughly proportional to their respective shares of the
citizen voting-age population in the Miami-Dade County area. 55
The next major vote-fragmentation case to reach the Supreme Court did not come until over a decade after Emison and
De Grandy, when the Court heard League of United Latin American Citizens v Perry 56 (“LULAC”) in 2006. In LULAC, the plaintiffs alleged that a congressional district plan in Texas had diluted the strength of the Latino vote through vote
fragmentation. 57 In contrast to its findings in Emison and De
Grandy, the Court in LULAC expressly held that all three
Gingles preconditions had been satisfied, both because Latinos
had constituted a citizen voting-age majority in the challenged
district prior to the plan’s enactment and because there was
substantial evidence of racially polarized voting within that district. 58 The Court further held that the totality of the circumstances corroborated the plaintiffs’ vote dilution claim. 59 In particular, the Court pointed to the history of voting discrimination
in Texas, the disproportionately low number of Texas congressional districts in which Latinos comprised a citizen voting-age
majority, and the incumbent representatives’ unresponsiveness
to Latinos’ “particularized” political interests. 60
c) Vote packing. Perhaps the least commonly recognized
theory of vote dilution, vote packing occurs when a district plan
crowds an artificially high number of minority voters into a sinappealed directly from the federal district courts to the United States Supreme Court.
See 28 USC §§ 1253, 2284; 52 USCA § 10303(a)(5).
53 Emison, 507 US at 41 (quotation marks omitted).
54 De Grandy, 512 US at 1008–09.
55 Id at 1013–15.
56 548 US 399 (2006).
57 Id at 423–27.
58 Id at 427–28.
59 Id at 442.
60 LULAC, 548 US at 438–40 (quotation marks omitted).
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gle district, thereby preventing their votes from meaningfully influencing election outcomes in other districts. 61 In other words,
“‘[p]acking’ refers to the practice of filling a district with a supermajority of a given group or party.” 62
Voinovich v Quilter 63 was the first case in which the Supreme Court addressed a § 2 vote-packing claim. 64 In that case,
the plaintiffs challenged eight of Ohio’s state-legislative districts
on the grounds that African American voters had been disproportionately packed into those districts in a way that considerably diminished the political influence they would have been otherwise able to wield across other districts. 65 The Court disposed
of the case for the same reason that it had ruled in favor of the
state defendants in Emison: the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the
Gingles preconditions because the record lacked evidence that
voting patterns in Ohio were racially polarized. 66
Vote subsumption, vote fragmentation, and vote packing are
not, however, the only theories available to a plaintiff seeking to
strike down a district plan as racially discriminatory. Instead, a
plaintiff may separately advance an equal protection theory of
unlawful racial districting, as the next Section explains.
2. Racial gerrymandering claims under the Equal
Protection Clause.
In addition to challenging the legality of district plans under
§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act, plaintiffs may challenge district
plans as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause. The prototypical equal protection districting claim alleges racial gerrymandering, which courts have
defined as “the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district
boundaries and populations for partisan or personal political
purposes.” 67 The theory underlying such a claim is that a state’s
intentional use of race as the basis for sorting voters into districts relies on harmful stereotypes and segregates voters in a
manner incompatible with the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarSee, for example, Quilter, 507 US at 149–51.
Vieth, 541 US at 286 n 7 (Scalia) (plurality).
63 507 US 146 (1993).
64 Id at 149–50. Note that vote-packing claims have also been referred to as “influence-dilution claims.” Id at 154.
65 Id at 149–50.
66 See id at 158.
67 Davis v Bandemer, 478 US 109, 164 (1986), quoting Kirkpatrick v Preisler, 394
US 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas concurring).
61
62
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antee of equal protection under the law. 68 As such, any district
plan that is intentionally designed in accordance with raceconscious principles—including but not limited to plans that result in vote subsumption, vote fragmentation, or vote packing 69—may be susceptible to an equal protection challenge.
To prevail on an equal protection racial gerrymandering
claim, a plaintiff must prove that race was the “predominant”
motivation for the challenged district’s design by showing that
the state subordinated traditional, judicially recognized districting principles to racial considerations. 70 Such traditional districting principles include compactness, 71 contiguity, 72 and respect for communities defined by shared political interests. 73
Plaintiffs may attempt to expose a departure from these principles by showing that districts have relatively “bizarre” shapes. 74
They can also use computer algorithms and modeling software
to demonstrate that districts are homogeneous with respect to
race but not with respect to other community characteristics. 75
If a plaintiff successfully makes a prima facie showing of racial gerrymandering, the court then evaluates whether the district plan survives strict scrutiny. 76 One of the most demanding
forms of judicial review, strict scrutiny requires a court to inquire whether a challenged state law furthers a “compelling interest” and is “narrowly tailored” to further that interest. 77 If the
68 See Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900, 911–12 (1995). See also Richard H. Pildes and
Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating
Election-District Appearances after Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich L Rev 483, 506–09 (1993)
(characterizing the injury caused by racial gerrymanders as an “expressive harm”).
69 See Part I.B.1 (elaborating on these three types of race-conscious districting).
70 Johnson, 515 US at 916.
71 See Note, Reapportionment, 79 Harv L Rev 1228, 1285 (1966) (“[T]he compactness of a legislative district can be measured by determining the extent to which its area
deviates from the area of the smallest circle that completely circumscribes the district.”).
For attempts to more rigorously define “compactness” using various quantitative approaches, see Pildes and Niemi, 92 Mich L Rev at 553–69 (cited in note 68); Nicholas O.
Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 Harv L Rev 1903, 1967–80 (2012).
72 See Note, 79 Harv L Rev at 1284 (“A contiguous district is one in which a person
can go from any point within the district to any other point without leaving the district.”).
73 See Johnson, 515 US at 916.
74 Bush v Vera, 517 US 952, 979 (1996) (O’Connor) (plurality).
75 See Micah Altman and Michael McDonald, The Promise and Perils of Computers
in Redistricting, 5 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol 69, 72–79 (2010) (describing the role of
computer software in modern electoral-districting processes).
76 See, for example, Shaw I, 509 US at 644; Johnson, 515 US at 913–14.
77 16B Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law § 862 at 316–17 (2009). See also Stephen A.
Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 Am J Le-

82 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW __ (FORTHCOMING)

2015]

Sued If You Do, Sued If You Don’t

6/30/2015 7:03 PM

113

government cannot convince the court that the state law at issue
satisfies both prongs of strict scrutiny review, then the court
must strike down the law as unconstitutional. 78 Thus, when
strict scrutiny is triggered in the racial gerrymandering context,
a challenged district plan stands only if the state can show that
the plan was narrowly tailored to advance some compelling government interest. 79
The legal regimes governing equal protection and § 2 claims
thus differ in two noteworthy respects. First, a plaintiff bringing
an equal protection claim must prove that state officials intentionally considered race in the design of a district plan. 80 In contrast, Congress’s post-Bolden amendments to the Voting Rights
Act ensured that intent need not be proven as an element of a
§ 2 claim. 81 Accordingly, at least in this respect, a plaintiff bears
a heavier burden of proof if she chooses to challenge a district
plan under the Equal Protection Clause instead of under § 2.82
On the other hand, an equal protection challenge does not require an inquiry into the demographic voting patterns of various
racial groups in the relevant jurisdiction. 83 Thus, a racialdistricting claim that takes the form of an equal protection challenge may have some advantages over one brought under § 2,
because an equal protection plaintiff does not need to hurdle the
fact-intensive Gingles preconditions or § 2’s totality-of-thecircumstances inquiry to prevail.
Shaw v Reno 84 (“Shaw I”) was the first case in which the
Supreme Court recognized a claim of racial gerrymandering under the Equal Protection Clause. 85 The dispute in Shaw I arose
gal Hist 355, 358 (2006) (comparing strict scrutiny to other, more permissive forms of
judicial review, such as “intermediate scrutiny” and “rationality review”).
78 See 16B Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law § 862 at 315–17 (2009).
79 See, for example, Johnson, 515 US at 915; Cromartie, 526 US at 543.
80 See, for example, Cromartie, 526 US at 546.
81 See text accompanying notes 24–28.
82 This burden, however, is lighter in cases in which districts are particularly egregiously misshaped, because it is easier for plaintiffs in such cases to convince a court
that district designs are explainable only on racial grounds. See, for example, Figure 1
and text accompanying notes 85–92.
83 See, for example, Shaw I, 509 US at 642–49.
84 509 US 630 (1993).
85 Earlier racial gerrymandering cases were often decided under the Fifteenth
Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. See, for example, Gomillion v
Lightfoot, 364 US 339, 345–48 (1960) (analyzing the constitutionality of racial gerrymanders under the Fifteenth Amendment). The Fourteenth Amendment, however, has
since come to dominate the arena of voting-rights litigation because the Court has come
to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting a category of voting-rights claims
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from a redistricting plan in North Carolina that created two majority-minority districts to give greater effect to the votes of African American citizens. 86 Specifically, a majority-minority district
is an electoral district in which a group that is nationally a racial or ethnic minority comprises a majority of the citizen votingage population. 87 White voters in North Carolina challenged the
districts at issue in Shaw I as racial classifications violative of
the Equal Protection Clause. 88 The case reached the Supreme
Court on the threshold question whether the plaintiffs had stated an equal protection claim capable of surviving the state defendants’ motion to dismiss. 89 The Court answered this question
in the affirmative, reasoning that the shapes of the challenged
districts “[could not] be understood as anything other than an
effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of
race.” 90 Consequently, it remanded the case with instructions for
the district court to engage in strict scrutiny review of the challenged districts. 91 The shapes of those districts, Districts 1 and
12, are depicted below in Figure 1. 92 Both districts appear in
black on the map and are readily describable as so “bizarre” 93 as
to be “irrational on [their] face.” 94

(including vote dilution claims) that is broader than that prohibited by the Fifteenth
Amendment. See Shaw I, 509 US at 640–45 (tracing the history of Gomillion and subsequent related cases to explain the Shaw I Court’s decision to evaluate racial gerrymandering under the Fourteenth Amendment instead of the Fifteenth Amendment); Samuel
Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan, and Richard H. Pildes, The Law of Democracy: Legal
Structure of the Political Process 15 (Foundation 4th ed 2012) (describing the Equal Protection Clause as “[t]he major source of constitutional voting rights litigation”).
86 Shaw I, 509 US at 633–34.
87 See Strickland, 556 US at 13 (Kennedy) (plurality).
88 Shaw I, 509 US at 636–37.
89 See id at 634.
90 Id at 649.
91 Id at 658. Three years after Shaw I was remanded, the case returned to the Supreme Court as Shaw v Hunt, 517 US 899 (1996) (“Shaw II”). For a discussion of Shaw
II, see Part II.A.
92 For an original copy of the map shown in Figure 1, see Shaw I, 509 US at Appendix.
93 Shaw I, 509 US at 644.
94 Id at 652.
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FIGURE 1. MAP OF THE DISTRICT PLAN CHALLENGED IN SHAW V
RENO

Two years later, another racial gerrymandering case, Miller
v Johnson, 95 reached the Court, this time presenting the justices
with the question of what constitutes a “compelling state interest” for purposes of strict scrutiny review of a racial gerrymander. 96 The plaintiffs, again a group of white voters, 97 had challenged the constitutionality of the Eleventh District of Georgia’s
1992 congressional district plan. 98 “Extending from Atlanta to
the Atlantic,” the Court noted, the Eleventh District was
“[g]eographically . . . a monstrosity,” sprawling across the state
of Georgia to tie together “four discrete, widely spaced urban
centers” densely populated by African Americans. 99 Figure 2
shows a map of the Eleventh District’s shape and population
density, with the large dark regions of the map indicating the
locations of the urban areas to which the Court referred. Figure 3 shows a map of Georgia’s entire 1992 congressional district plan, with the Eleventh District appearing at the map’s
center and nearly stretching across the entire width of the
state. 100

95
96
97
98
99
100

A–B.

515 US 900 (1995).
Id at 903–04.
See id at 929–30 (Stevens dissenting) (noting the plaintiff-appellants’ race).
Id at 909.
Johnson, 515 US at 908–09 (quotation marks omitted).
For original copies of the maps shown in Figures 2 and 3, see id at Appendices
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FIGURE 2. POPULATION-DENSITY MAP OF THE DISTRICT
CHALLENGED IN MILLER V JOHNSON
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FIGURE 3. MAP OF THE DISTRICT PLAN CHALLENGED IN MILLER V
JOHNSON

The DOJ had previously approved the 1992 district plan at
issue in Johnson under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, after commanding that the General Assembly of Georgia adopt a plan
with the maximum possible number of majority-black districts. 101 The state defendants accordingly argued that the challenged plan survived strict scrutiny review on the grounds that
its adoption had furthered Georgia’s interest in obtaining the
DOJ’s approval under § 5. 102 Rejecting the state defendants’ argument, the Johnson Court decided that compliance with the
DOJ’s erroneous interpretation of § 5 could not constitute such a

101 Id at 907–09. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires certain states with a
history of discriminatory voting practices to submit proposed changes to their voting
laws for approval by the DOJ prior to enactment. See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 79
Stat at 439, 52 USCA § 10304. Until recently, § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act prescribed
the formula that determined whether a given state was subject to § 5’s requirements.
See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(b), 79 Stat at 438, 52 USCA § 10303(b). But in 2013,
the Supreme Court struck down the § 4(b) formula as unconstitutional and thus rendered § 5 functionally inoperative. See Shelby County, Alabama v Holder, 133 S Ct 2612,
2631 (2013).
102 See Johnson, 515 US at 920–22.
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compelling interest, because to permit otherwise would “surrender[ ] to the Executive Branch [the Court’s] role in enforcing
constitutional limits on race-based official action.” 103 Consequently, the Court held that the plan did not survive strict scrutiny and struck it down as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander violative of the Equal Protection Clause. 104
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, however, differs significantly in scope and involves distinct legal issues as compared to
§ 2. Section 5 is a mechanism for federal regulation of state voting practices and thereby implicates the proper scope of federal
executive power, whereas § 2 establishes a cause of action that
private parties can use to directly challenge those practices. As
such, the Johnson decision has no direct bearing on the question
whether compliance with § 2 may ever constitute a compelling
interest justifying race-conscious districting. 105 That question
therefore remains legally unresolved, even though the Court has
had opportunities to address it in several cases. Part II discusses those cases in further detail.
II. PAST ATTEMPTS TO USE § 2 AS A DEFENSE
In response to a number of racial gerrymandering challenges brought in recent decades, states have attempted to defend
their district plans on the grounds that they were strategically
designed to ensure compliance with § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act. 106 The Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly and expressly left unanswered the question whether compliance with
§ 2 can ever provide states with a successful defense against a
racial gerrymandering challenge brought on equal protection
grounds. For example, in the racial gerrymandering case Shaw v
Hunt 107 (“Shaw II”), the majority left the question of the § 2 defense’s availability unresolved, writing: “We assume, arguendo,
103 Id at 922, citing United States v Nixon, 418 US 683, 704 (1974), Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 211 (1962), and Cooper
v Aaron, 358 US 1, 18 (1958). Notably, however, four justices later expressed support for
the proposition that compliance with the DOJ’s interpretation of § 5 could potentially
qualify as a compelling state interest in other circumstances. See LULAC, 548 US at
518–19 (Scalia concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
104 Johnson, 515 US at 920–22, 927–28.
105 See id at 921 (expressly leaving unanswered the question “[w]hether or not in
some cases compliance with the [Voting Rights] Act . . . can provide a compelling interest” justifying race-conscious districting).
106 See, for example, Bush v Vera, 517 US 952, 976–77 (1996) (O’Connor) (plurality).
107 517 US 899 (1996).
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for the purpose of resolving this suit, that compliance with § 2
could be a compelling interest.” 108 A total of five justices summed
across plurality and concurring opinions rendered a similar result in the subsequent racial gerrymandering case Bush v
Vera. 109 In Vera, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote on behalf of
a three-justice plurality: “[W]e assume without deciding that
compliance with the [§ 2] results test . . . can be a compelling
state interest.” 110 Likewise, Justice Clarence Thomas stated in a
concurring opinion joined by one other justice that he was “willing to assume without deciding that the State [had] asserted a
compelling interest.” 111
When the Court treats a legal proposition as assumed but
not decided, that proposition cannot be cited as binding precedent in future cases. 112 Thus, because the Court has expressly
carved out the threshold question of the § 2 defense’s viability as
assumed but undecided, it remains an open question whether
the defense can ever be successfully wielded against an equal
protection racial gerrymandering claim. Similarly, whether § 2
can sustain a defense against a vote dilution claim brought under § 2 itself remains unresolved.
This Part begins by discussing the cases in which states
have attempted to raise a § 2 defense to claims of racial gerrymandering. It then proceeds to analyze the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Bartlett v Strickland. 113 In that case, the state defendants raised § 2 as a defense not to a racial gerrymandering
claim but to a claim that a district plan violated state election
laws under the state’s own constitution. 114 Even though Strickland did not itself involve a racial-districting challenge, the
Court’s analysis in that case illuminates several aspects of the
§ 2 defense’s potential viability.

Id at 915.
517 US 952 (1996).
110 Id at 977 (O’Connor) (plurality).
111 Id at 1003 (Thomas concurring).
112 See, for example, National Aeronautics and Space Administration v Nelson, 131
S Ct 746, 766 (2011) (Scalia concurring) (explaining that “stare decisis is simply irrelevant when the pertinent precedent assumed, without deciding, the existence of a constitutional right”).
113 556 US 1 (2009).
114 See id at 7–8 (Kennedy) (plurality).
108
109
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A. Section 2 as a Defense against Equal Protection Claims
In response to racial gerrymandering claims brought under
the Equal Protection Clause, state defendants have traditionally
focused their litigation resources on attacking the elements of
the plaintiffs’ prima facie case, denying that race was the “predominant factor” motivating the design of the district plan in
question. 115 But in a few cases, states have additionally argued
that, to the extent that racial considerations motivated the design of a given district plan, those considerations were necessary
to avoid a violation of § 2 and were therefore legally justified.
This § 2 defense has surfaced before the US Supreme Court in
Shaw II and Vera, sister cases for which the Court released its
decisions on the same day. 116 In both, the Court expressly declined to address the threshold question of the § 2 defense’s viability. 117
Premised on the same dispute underlying Shaw I, 118 Shaw
II presented the Court with the question whether North Carolina’s challenged district plan survived strict scrutiny. 119 The state
defendants argued that it did, on the grounds that the plan had
been necessary for the state to avoid violating § 2. 120 In evaluating the merits of this defense, the Court began by announcing
that it would assume without deciding, “for the purpose of resolving this suit, that compliance with § 2 could be a compelling
interest.” 121 Operating under this assumption, the Court implicitly adopted the district court’s reasoning that § 2—if it could
constitute a compelling interest at all—could do so only if the defendants could show that the state would have been in violation
of § 2 but for the enactment of the challenged plan. 122 Doctrinally, this placed a burden of proof on the defendants that was
identical to the burden that plaintiffs must bear when making a
prima facie showing of a § 2 violation. That is, the state defendants were required to use the Gingles preconditions and the to-

115 See, for example, Johnson, 515 US at 916–18; Alabama Legislative Black Caucus
v Alabama, 2015 US LEXIS 2122, *14–17 (US).
116 Shaw II, 517 US at 899; Vera, 517 US at 952.
117 See Shaw II, 517 US at 915; Vera, 517 US at 977 (O’Connor) (plurality).
118 For a discussion of Shaw I, see text accompanying notes 84–92.
119 Shaw II, 517 US at 901–02.
120 See State Appellees’ Brief, Shaw v Hunt, Docket Nos 94-923, 94-924, *39–49 (US
filed Oct 25, 1995) (available on Westlaw at 1995 WL 632461).
121 Shaw II, 517 US at 915.
122 See id at 914–18.
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tality-of-the-circumstances test to establish that whatever district plan had previously been in place had violated § 2. 123
On the facts of Shaw II, the fatal flaw in the state’s argument was that the minority group in the challenged district was
not sufficiently “geographically compact.” 124 As a result, the
Court reasoned that the district could not have been successfully
challenged as resulting in vote dilution under § 2, because no
hypothetical plaintiff could have established the first of the
three Gingles preconditions. 125 In turn, because no plaintiff could
have prevailed on a § 2 challenge against the district in question, the state could not claim as a defense that it had “narrowly
tailored” that district’s boundaries in furtherance of a “compelling state interest” in avoiding a § 2 violation. 126 Accordingly, the
Court concluded that North Carolina’s district plan did not survive strict scrutiny. 127
In Vera, five of the justices again deliberately refrained from
deciding whether avoidance of a § 2 violation can ever provide a
defense to a claim of racial gerrymandering, explaining that
they would “assume without deciding that compliance with the
[§ 2] results test . . . can be a compelling state interest” for purposes of strict scrutiny review. 128 As in Shaw II, the Court in
Vera ultimately held that even with the benefit of this assumption, the district plan at issue could not survive strict scrutiny,
because the challenged district was not geographically compact
as required by the first Gingles precondition. 129
O’Connor also authored a separate concurrence in Vera to
express her view that compliance with § 2 should qualify as a
compelling state interest in at least some cases. She reasoned
that “it would be irresponsible for a State to disregard the § 2
results test” in light of the obligations that Congress intended
§ 2 to impose on the states. 130 Notably, some district courts have
latched on to this concurrence as support for the conclusion that
See id at 914–16.
Id at 916 (quotation marks omitted).
125 See Shaw II, 517 US at 916–17. Recall that the first Gingles precondition requires a showing that the relevant minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a numerical majority of the citizen voting-age population in a
single-member legislative district. See note 33 and accompanying text.
126 See Shaw II, 517 US at 916–17.
127 Id at 902.
128 Vera, 517 US at 977 (O’Connor) (plurality). See also id at 1003 (Thomas concurring).
129 See id at 978–79 (O’Connor) (plurality); id at 1003 (Thomas concurring).
130 Id at 991–92 (O’Connor concurring).
123
124
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compliance with § 2 may justify a court’s use of race-conscious
principles in crafting remedial district plans following a judicial
determination that a state has violated the Voting Rights Act. 131
Most recently, the § 2 defense was raised in the state court
case of Dickson v Rucho. 132 In that case, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held that § 2 offers state defendants a defense
for race-conscious districting. 133 In finding that compliance with
§ 2 could constitute a compelling state interest for purposes of
strict scrutiny review, the court began by observing that “the
Voting Rights Act creates tension with the Fourteenth Amendment.” 134 It then proceeded to justify its recognition of the § 2 defense on the grounds that, without the defense’s availability, the
state would be unable to lawfully comply with the requirements
of the Voting Rights Act. 135 The court also reasoned that the § 2
defense’s availability makes pragmatic sense because it provides
states with expanded opportunities to avoid the potentially
heavy costs of districting litigation. 136 Applying the defense to
the facts before it, the court found in favor of the state defendants because they had “show[n] a strong basis in evidence that
the possibility of a section 2 violation existed” at the time that
they had drawn the remedial district plan at issue. 137
Though O’Connor expressed concerns similar to those raised
in Dickson, those concerns were unable to convince a majority of
the justices in Vera to definitively rule on the issue of the § 2 defense’s general availability. 138 As such, whether a state may ever
131 See Colleton County Council v McConnell, 201 F Supp 2d 618, 639–40 (D SC
2002) (three-judge panel); King v State Board of Elections, 979 F Supp 619, 621–22 (ND
Ill 1997) (three-judge panel).
132 766 SE2d 238 (NC 2014), vacd and remd, 2015 WL 223554 (US) (remanding the
case to the Supreme Court of North Carolina for reconsideration in light of Alabama Legislative Black Caucus).
133 See Dickson, 766 SE2d at 248.
134 Id.
135 See id (“Because the Supreme Court of the United States and the United States
Congress have indicated without ambiguity that they expect States to comply with the
Voting Rights Act, state laws passed for the purpose of complying with the Act must be
capable of surviving strict scrutiny.”).
136 See id at 248.
137 Dickson, 766 SE2d at 249–52.
138 It may be that the Court has left the question of § 2 defense’s viability undecided
out of a desire to avoid the constitutional issues implicated by the defense. See Vera, 517
US at 990–92 (O’Connor concurring) (discussing the tension between the obligations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act, and defending the
Court’s assumption that compliance with § 2 can constitute a compelling interest on the
grounds that “[s]tatutes are presumed constitutional”). For another case in which the
Court similarly sought to avoid a decision on an underlying constitutional issue, see Her-
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successfully raise a § 2 defense against an equal protection claim
remains an open question yet to be resolved among the federal
courts.
B. Section 2 as a Defense against State Constitutional Claims
While the Supreme Court has never resolved whether states
may use § 2 of the Voting Rights Act as a defense against racialdistricting claims, it recently addressed a related question concerning § 2’s application as a defense to nonracial state electionlaw claims. The case in which that question arose, Bartlett v
Strickland, began as a suit in North Carolina state court against
various state officials. 139 The North Carolina General Assembly
had drawn the lines of its District 18 in a manner that split
Pender County, North Carolina, into two separate statelegislative districts. 140 The plaintiffs alleged that this district
plan violated the North Carolina Constitution’s Whole County
Provision, which prohibits the General Assembly “from dividing
counties when drawing legislative districts for the State House
and Senate.” 141
The state defendants countered that the General Assembly
had necessarily split Pender County across two districts to comply with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 142 More specifically, the defendants claimed that District 18 had been drawn to ensure that
it contained a black voting-age population of 39.36 percent—a
percentage high enough “to give African-American voters the potential to join with majority voters to elect the minority group’s
candidate of its choice” 143 and thus to create a “crossover district.” 144 A crossover district (also sometimes termed a “coalitional district” 145) is a district in which minority voters compose

rera v Collins, 506 US 390, 416–17 (1993) (assuming without deciding that “actual innocence” demonstrated post-trial may warrant habeas relief, and thus avoiding a precedential decision on the underlying constitutionality of executing a criminal defendant who
has proven such innocence).
139 Strickland, 556 US at 8 (Kennedy) (plurality).
140 Id at 7–8 (Kennedy) (plurality).
141 Id (Kennedy) (plurality), citing NC Const Art II, §§ 3, 5.
142 Strickland, 556 US at 8 (Kennedy) (plurality).
143 Id (Kennedy) (plurality).
144 Id at 14 (Kennedy) (plurality).
145 See, for example, Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 NC L Rev 1517, 1539 (2002) (using the term “coalitional districts” to refer to districts in which “the black registered vote
population is less than 50% (typically 33%–39%) and the rest of the registered voters are
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less than 50 percent of the population but are still large enough
in number to elect the candidate of their choice with the help of
“crossover” votes from majority voters supporting the same candidate. 146
Had the General Assembly instead left Pender County
whole, District 18 would have had a black voting-age population
of only 35.33 percent instead of 39.36 percent—with only the latter percentage being high enough to create a crossover district. 147 The dispute in Strickland therefore turned on whether
§ 2 required state officials to strengthen the influence of minorities’ votes through the creation of crossover districts. 148 If and
only if it did, then the state defendants could persuasively wield
§ 2 as a defense by asserting that § 2 superseded the Whole
County Provision in the North Carolina Constitution by virtue of
the US Constitution’s Supremacy Clause. 149
No opinion commanded a majority in Strickland, but five
justices agreed that § 2 does not require state legislatures to
create crossover districts. 150 The North Carolina state officials’
§ 2 defense thus necessarily failed because it had relied on the
theory that § 2 indeed required the creation of crossover districts. 151 Key to the Court’s rejection of this theory—at least as
explained in Justice Anthony Kennedy’s plurality opinion—was
the fact that African Americans comprised less than 50 percent
of the voting-age population in District 18, both as it was actually drawn and as it counterfactually could have been drawn to include the entirety of Pender County. 152 In other words, the Court
found that no matter how the General Assembly had drawn its
district plan, it would have been impossible for state officials to
draw any electoral district covering Pender County that could
have reached a black voting-age population of over 50 percent.
As such, no conceivable plan could have allowed a hypothetical
§ 2 plaintiff to show that the black voting-age population was
non-Hispanic whites”). Throughout this Comment, the terms “crossover district” and
“coalitional district” are used interchangeably.
146 See Strickland, 556 US at 13 (Kennedy) (plurality).
147 Id at 14 (Kennedy) (plurality).
148 Id at 6 (Kennedy) (plurality).
149 See id at 7 (Kennedy) (plurality). See also US Const Art VI, cl 2 (“[T]he Laws of
the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”).
150 Strickland, 556 US at 14 (Kennedy) (plurality); id at 26 (Thomas concurring).
151 See id at 14 (Kennedy) (plurality).
152 See id (Kennedy) (plurality).
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sufficiently large to constitute a majority of a single-member
district in the Pender County area—a showing that such a
plaintiff would be required to establish in order to make out a
prima facie case of vote dilution under Gingles. 153 In turn, no
plaintiff could have succeeded in challenging any district covering the Pender County area under § 2, regardless of how the
General Assembly had decided to draw its district plan. The
state defendants therefore could not credibly contend that the
area in Pender County would have been susceptible to a § 2
challenge but for the enactment of the plan at issue. 154 The
Court accordingly rejected the state’s argument that the plan
was necessary to ensure state compliance with § 2. 155
Although the Strickland Court did not address whether
states may use § 2 as a defense against federal racial-districting
claims, the plurality’s reasoning has implications for the application of the § 2 defense against racial gerrymandering and vote
dilution challenges. In particular, because § 2 does not require
states to create crossover districts, it follows that the § 2 defense
cannot succeed if a plaintiff challenges a district whose demographics could have given rise to a crossover district but not
to a majority-minority district. This is because, after Strickland,
electoral districts are immune from § 2 liability if they are located in geographic areas where it is demographically impossible
for racial minorities to compose 50 percent or more of the votingage population of any single-member district. 156 As a result,
states will never face § 2 liability for districts in these areas. Accordingly, they can never credibly defend race-conscious districting in such areas by arguing that such districting was necessary
to avoid § 2 liability.
Significantly, however, Strickland leaves room for states to
use § 2 as a basis for creating crossover districts as alternatives
to majority-minority districts in geographic areas whose demographics give rise to § 2 violations under the standards set
forth in Gingles. This is because Strickland imposes a 50 percent
threshold requirement only on the prima facie elements of a § 2
violation and not on the adequacy of a state’s remedy for such a

153
154
155
156

See Gingles, 478 US at 50–51.
See Strickland, 556 US at 14 (Kennedy) (plurality).
Id at 24–25 (Kennedy) (plurality).
See id at 24 (Kennedy) (plurality).
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violation. 157 Of course, the extent to which states may safely
remedy § 2 violations by creating crossover districts postStrickland must be qualified by the fact that only three justices
signed on to the plurality opinion in that case. Further casting
doubt over crossover districts’ efficacy is the warning of Strickland’s principal dissent that the Court’s decision interpreted § 2
in a manner that functionally requires states to create majorityminority districts, 158 despite the plurality’s protestations that it
intended no such thing. 159 It is against this backdrop that any
comprehensive analysis of the § 2 defense’s potential viability
must be considered.
III. IMPLEMENTING THE § 2 DEFENSE
As discussed in the previous Part, several states have attempted to defend against racial gerrymandering claims by arguing that state officials drew the districts at issue to remedy or
avoid a violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 160 When a state
raises this defense, it must demonstrate its counterfactual violation of § 2 by satisfying the Gingles preconditions and the totality-of-the-circumstances test—the same doctrinal tools that
plaintiffs must use to establish a prima facie case of § 2 vote dilution. 161 However, though some lower courts have recognized
the availability of the § 2 defense, 162 the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged but expressly declined to address the
question of the defense’s legal viability. 163 As a result, state officials have been left to speculate about the answers to a number
of legal questions that bear on how states should design district
plans: To what extent does § 2 require or allow states to take
race into account when drawing districts? If those districts are
challenged as either constituting racial gerrymanders or result157 Id at 19–20 (Kennedy) (plurality) (“[A] party asserting § 2 liability must show by
a preponderance of the evidence that the minority population in the potential election
district is greater than 50 percent.”) (emphasis added).
158 Strickland, 556 US at 27 (Souter dissenting).
159 See, for example, id at 23 (Kennedy) (plurality) (“[Section] 2 allows States to
choose their own method of complying with the Voting Rights Act, and we have said that
may include drawing crossover districts. . . . Our holding [ ] should not be interpreted to
entrench majority-minority districts by statutory command.”).
160 See Shaw II, 517 US at 914; Vera, 517 US at 976 (O’Connor) (plurality); Dickson,
766 SE2d at 248.
161 See Gingles, 478 US at 50–51; Quilter, 507 US at 157.
162 See, for example, Dickson, 766 SE2d at 252.
163 See Shaw II, 517 US at 915; Vera, 517 US at 977 (O’Connor) (plurality). See also
Johnson, 515 US at 921.
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ing in vote dilution, when will states’ attempts to comply with
§ 2 create a valid affirmative defense for race-conscious districting? And how will courts engage in a legal analysis of such a defense’s merits?
This Part explores and attempts to resolve these questions.
Part III.A offers doctrinal support for the § 2 defense’s availability against federal claims of unlawful racial districting. Part
III.B then describes some key aspects of the § 2 defense’s application in practice, drawing on analogies to the Supreme Court’s
affirmative action cases to situate this analysis within the
Court’s broader jurisprudence. In light of the ways in which the
defense would apply in practice, Part III.C recommends that
states make effective use of racial coalitional districts to minimize their risk of liability for unlawful racial districting. Finally,
Part III.D concludes by discussing some normative implications
of interpreting § 2 in a way that permits limited considerations
of race in the redistricting process.
A. Establishing a Basis for the § 2 Defense
As Justice Antonin Scalia has pointed out, recognition of defenses based on the Voting Rights Act may be normatively
wise. 164 If courts fail to recognize § 2 as a defense for raceconscious remedial districting, then states in violation of § 2 will
inevitably find themselves in an “impossible position,” 165 forced
to choose among three undesirable options: leave a violative district plan as is and risk liability under § 2, fix the plan using
race-conscious principles but risk violating the Equal Protection
Clause, or attempt to fix the plan using a race-neutral approach
but risk either failing to remedy the existing violation or creating a new one. 166 The availability of a § 2 defense solves this
quandary by providing states with an escape hatch to correct
noncompliant districts without simultaneously creating fresh
risks of litigation. 167

164 See LULAC, 548 US at 518 (Scalia concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
165 Id (Scalia concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
166 A strictly race-neutral approach to remedial districting can leave a state exposed
to liability because, under the Gingles results test, § 2 liability may attach even if state
officials do not actively intend to take race into account when drawing district lines. See
text accompanying notes 33–36.
167 See Dickson, 766 SE2d at 248 (advancing the policy argument that the § 2 defense’s availability has the potential to reduce states’ litigation costs).
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In addition to this normative support for the § 2 defense’s
availability, doctrinal frameworks already exist to support the
§ 2 defense and to legally justify race-conscious districting. This
Section discusses those doctrinal frameworks, first in the context of equal protection racial gerrymandering claims and then
in the context of § 2 vote dilution claims.
1. The compelling-interest prong of strict scrutiny review.
To the extent that its past cases have considered how the
§ 2 defense could fit into existing doctrinal frameworks, the Supreme Court has indicated that whether states may ever use § 2
as a defense—at least against equal protection claims of racial
gerrymandering—turns on whether compliance with § 2 constitutes a “compelling interest” for purposes of strict scrutiny review. 168
That § 2 is essentially a codification of the Fifteenth
Amendment 169 suggests that compliance with § 2 can in fact
qualify as a compelling state interest in some circumstances.
The Supreme Court has observed that § 2’s purpose is to enforce
the right to vote guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment.170
Furthermore, the similarity between the texts of § 2 and the Fifteenth Amendment suggests the interchangeable nature of the
rights they protect: § 2 prohibits “any State or political subdivision” from imposing voting practices that “result[ ] in a denial or
abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color,” 171 and the Fifteenth Amendment likewise provides that “[t]he right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race [or] color.” 172 As such,
to the extent that § 2 operationalizes the principles established

168 See, for example, Shaw II, 517 US at 915 (assuming for the sake of argument
that § 2 could be used as a defense and situating the analysis of this defense within the
strict scrutiny framework); Vera, 517 US at 977 (O’Connor) (plurality) (same).
169 See notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
170 See National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v New York, 413
US 345, 350 (1973) (“Section 2 . . . clearly indicates that the purpose of the Act is to assist in the effectuation of the Fifteenth Amendment.”). See also South Carolina v
Katzenbach, 383 US 301, 308 (1966), overruled on other grounds by Shelby County, Alabama v Holder, 133 S Ct 2612 (2013) (characterizing the Voting Rights Act as
“effectuat[ing] . . . the [Fifteenth Amendment’s] prohibition against racial discrimination
in voting”).
171 52 USCA § 10301(a).
172 US Const Amend XV, § 1.
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by the Fifteenth Amendment, § 2 can be understood as a codification of constitutional rights.
Outside the voting-rights context, the Supreme Court has
stated that, for purposes of strict scrutiny review, government
officials may justify race-conscious action if it is undertaken to
avert what would otherwise result in “a prima facie case of a . . .
statutory violation.” 173 The Court has further suggested that this
justification for race-conscious action is especially robust when
the statutory right is closely tied to a constitutional one. For example, the Court has found that race-conscious state action may
be lawful if undertaken to avoid disparate impact liability under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 174 which statutorily extends the Fourteenth Amendment’s limitations on race discrimination in employment from the state to the private sector. 175 By
analogy to these strict scrutiny precedents, compliance with § 2
may likewise constitute a compelling state interest for purposes
of strict scrutiny review of an alleged racial gerrymander—
particularly in light of the close relationship between § 2 and the
Fifteenth Amendment. 176
Some scholars have suggested that, to the extent that compliance with § 2 constitutes a compelling government interest
requiring race-conscious districting, the modern Supreme Court
may be poised to strike it down as irredeemably at odds with the
Equal Protection Clause and therefore unconstitutional. 177 Yet

City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co, 488 US 469, 493–500 (1989).
Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 253, codified at 42 USC § 2000e et seq.
175 Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701(b), 703(a), 78 Stat at 253–55, codified at 42 USC
§ 2000e(b), e-2(a); Ricci v DeStefano, 557 US 557, 580–84 (2009). A testament to this relationship between Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment is that employment discrimination plaintiffs often bring claims against public employers under both laws concurrently. See, for example, id at 563; Local Number 93, International Association of
Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v City of Cleveland, 478 US 501, 504–05 (1986) (describing
a complaint filed by minority firefighters claiming that the City of Cleveland had violated both the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII).
176 This conclusion finds support from at least two of the justices who were seated
on the Court when Shaw II and Vera were decided. See Vieth v Jubelirer, 541 US 267,
351 (2004) (Souter dissenting) (speculating that a state defendant in an equal protection
partisan gerrymandering case could argue that a given district plan was justified under
§ 2 by “the need to avoid racial vote dilution”); Vera, 517 US at 990–92 (O’Connor concurring) (using the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act to argue that compliance
with § 2 could be a compelling state interest).
177 See, for example, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Future of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act in the Hands of a Conservative Court, 5 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol 125, 142–
43 (2010). The suggestion that the Court may be prepared to strike down § 2 has also
been made in the popular press. See, for example, Jeffrey Rosen, Eric Holder’s Suit
173
174
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several signals from the modern Court indicate that a majority
of the justices would not necessarily be so inclined. First, a reading of § 2 that places a wholesale prohibition on race-conscious
remedial districting would run counter to precedents in which
the Court has elsewhere tolerated limited state reliance on racial classifications, such as in the Title VII context and in cases
involving affirmative action university-admissions programs. 178
Second, and perhaps more importantly, four of the currently
seated justices agreed in LULAC that compliance with § 5 of the
Voting Rights Act could be a compelling state interest, despite
its potential tension with the Equal Protection Clause. 179 Significantly, the justices who endorsed this view were Chief Justice
John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas,
and Samuel Alito—a somewhat surprising assortment, given
some scholars’ view that these justices are the most politically
conservative members of today’s Court and would be more inclined than the other justices to strike down § 2 as unconstitutional. 180 These four justices reasoned that “[i]f compliance with
§ 5 were not a compelling state interest, then a State could be
placed in the impossible position of having to choose between
compliance with § 5 and compliance with the Equal Protection
Clause.” 181 Insofar as this logic extends to the § 2 context,
LULAC suggests that this same group of justices would be willing to join their colleagues in upholding an interpretation of § 2
that leaves room for race-conscious state action, contrary to
speculations in the academic literature.

against Texas Gives the Supreme Court a Chance to Gut Even More of the Voting Rights
Act (The New Republic, Sept 1, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/H8K5-JMVV.
178 See, for example, Ricci, 557 US at 580–84; Fisher v University of Texas at Austin,
133 S Ct 2411, 2419 (2013) (holding that courts must apply strict scrutiny in evaluating
the constitutionality of affirmative action measures in university admissions, rather
than holding that race-conscious admissions processes are per se violations of the Equal
Protection Clause).
179 LULAC, 548 US at 518 (Scalia concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part), citing Shaw II, 517 US at 909, and J.A. Croson, 488 US at 498–506 (concluding
that “compliance with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act can be [a compelling state] interest”
on the grounds that “race may be used where necessary to remedy identified past discrimination”).
180 See, for example, Fuentes-Rohwer, 5 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol at 142–43 (cited
in note 177).
181 LULAC, 548 US at 518 (Scalia concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
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2. The totality-of-the-circumstances test in vote dilution
analysis.
As discussed in the previous Section, an analogy to the Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny cases outside the § 2 context indicates that a doctrinal basis exists for states’ use of the § 2 defense against racial gerrymandering claims. This analogy,
however, speaks only to the viability of the defense as a shield
against equal protection challenges. It does not bear directly on
the defense’s viability as a shield against a claim of § 2 vote dilution, because a prima facie showing of vote dilution under § 2—
unlike a prima facie showing of an equal protection violation—
does not trigger strict scrutiny analysis. 182
Nevertheless, a doctrinal basis for the § 2 defense exists in
the vote dilution context as well: a court could situate a § 2 defense raised against a § 2 vote dilution claim within the broad,
fact-intensive totality-of-the-circumstances test that follows a
plaintiff’s showing of the three Gingles preconditions. 183 Remedial race-conscious districting reasonably falls among the considerations pertaining to the “history of voting-related discrimination” in a given geographic region, which the Senate Judiciary
Committee expressly enumerated as a factor relevant to the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry. 184 And even without this
clue from legislative history, the totality-of-the-circumstances
test—one of the most capacious legal standards in the judicial
compendium—is sufficiently wide reaching to account for the extent to which a state’s districting choices are motivated by a
need to comply with § 2.
On this account, courts would not need to invent a wholly
new doctrinal framework to recognize the viability of the § 2 defense in the context of vote dilution cases. In fact, in both racial
gerrymandering and vote dilution cases, courts could economize
on existing doctrinal structures by adapting the § 2 defense to
strict scrutiny analysis or to the totality-of-the-circumstances
inquiry, respectively. The ready availability of these doctrinal
frameworks thus offers a sound legal basis for judicial recognition of the § 2 defense.

See Part I.B.2.
See, for example, Quilter, 507 US at 157; De Grandy, 512 US at 1012.
184 Gingles, 478 US at 44–45, citing S Rep 97-417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess at 28–29 (cited in note 27).
182
183
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B. Applying the § 2 Defense
Having identified the doctrinal forms that the § 2 defense
may take, there remain questions as to how courts might actually evaluate the merits of the § 2 defense and under what circumstances the § 2 defense should prevail. As with the previous Section’s discussion of the doctrinal basis for the § 2 defense, a
discussion of these questions bifurcates into separate analyses:
one that examines the defense’s application against claims of racial gerrymandering brought under the Equal Protection Clause,
and one that examines the defense’s application against claims
of vote dilution premised on § 2 itself.
1. The § 2 defense vis-à-vis the Equal Protection Clause.
To use § 2 as a defense against a racial gerrymandering
claim brought under the Equal Protection Clause, a state must
show that (1) it had a compelling interest in avoiding a § 2 violation and (2) the challenged district was narrowly tailored to further that interest. 185 This doctrinal scheme follows from the Supreme Court’s apparent assumption that if § 2 offers a defense
to racial gerrymandering claims, then the merits of that defense
are properly analyzed within the framework traditionally used
for strict scrutiny review of state practices classifying citizens on
the basis of race. 186 To pass muster with respect to the first component of strict scrutiny review, a state raising the § 2 defense
must therefore show, using the three Gingles preconditions and
the totality-of-the-circumstances test, that the district plan in
place prior to the new, allegedly unconstitutional plan would
have been violative of § 2. 187 Absent this counterfactual § 2 violation, a state cannot credibly claim to have acted out of an interest in avoiding such a violation. Likewise, to satisfy the second,
narrow-tailoring prong of strict scrutiny review, a state must
demonstrate that alternative redistricting plans would have
been insufficient to avoid a § 2 violation. 188

See text accompanying notes 168–76.
See Johnson, 515 US at 915; Shaw I, 509 US at 643; Hunt v Cromartie, 526 US
541, 546 (1999).
187 See Shaw II, 517 US at 914–18. See also text accompanying notes 122–23.
188 See id at 917–18 (impliedly rejecting the proposition that a race-conscious remedial district plan can be “narrowly tailored” to correct a § 2 violation when an alternative
plan would have more effectively “address[ed] the [state’s] professed interest of relieving
[ ] vote dilution”).
185
186
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Whether a § 2 violation would have occurred but for the particular design of the challenged district plan is a question of law
that courts should decide with no deference to a state legislature’s ex ante assessment of its risk of § 2 liability. From a
pragmatic standpoint, a nondeferential approach to the § 2 defense may help courts identify district plans that are crafted not
out of good-faith attempts to comply with § 2 but instead out of
an intent to racially discriminate or otherwise unjustifiably rely
on racial classifications. A nondeferential approach to evaluating the § 2 defense thus strikes a workable compromise for judicial review of state redistricting: it recognizes states’ need to
have the defense available but simultaneously cabins states’
ability to use the defense as an excuse for unduly expansive reliance on race.
The legal underpinnings for a nondeferential approach to
evaluating the Gingles preconditions and the totality-of-thecircumstances test finds support in the approach that the Supreme Court has taken in affirmative action cases involving
university admissions. An analogy to this chapter of the Court’s
affirmative action jurisprudence is apposite for several reasons. 189 First, § 2 compliance and university affirmative action
measures share common means and goals: both types of government action involve race-conscious decision making on the
part of state actors for the purpose of decreasing the degree of
racial polarization within a community. Second, affirmative action cases, like racial gerrymandering cases, often involve claims
premised on the Equal Protection Clause and trigger strict scrutiny review. Thus, they compare instructively to the votingrights context. For example, two of the Court’s modern affirmative action cases—Fisher v University of Texas at Austin190 and
Grutter v Bollinger 191—were equal protection cases brought by
white plaintiffs who sought to dismantle affirmative action admission policies at higher education institutions. 192 Both cases
189 Notably, one of the judges in Dickson drew on precisely this analogy. See Dickson, 766 SE2d at 265 (Beasley concurring in part and dissenting in part), citing Fisher,
133 S Ct at 2419–20 (drawing on university admissions affirmative action cases to suggest a framework for strict scrutiny review of district plans designed on the basis of racial considerations). For an example of this analogy as made in the academic literature,
see Fuentes-Rohwer, 5 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol at 152 (cited in note 177) (briefly comparing states’ attempts at § 2 compliance with race-based affirmative action).
190 133 S Ct 2411 (2013).
191 539 US 306 (2003).
192 Fisher, 133 S Ct at 2415; Grutter, 539 US at 316–17.
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also reached the stage of strict scrutiny analysis. 193 Given these
shared characteristics, the Court’s affirmative action cases shed
light on which government interests may be deemed sufficiently
compelling to justify race-conscious state policies, including
race-conscious legislative districting. 194
Support for a nondeferential approach to the § 2 defense can
be parsed from a careful reading of these cases, even though
Fisher and Grutter send mixed signals about how much deference is due when state officials assert that a race-conscious action was narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest. On
the one hand, in Fisher the Court stated in no uncertain terms
that a state university “receives no deference” on the question
whether a race-based affirmative action program has been narrowly tailored to the university’s stated “goal of diversity.” 195 On
the other hand, the Court in Grutter held that a public law
school should be accorded some “degree of deference” on the
threshold question whether a goal of diversity can constitute a
compelling state interest at all. 196 Accordingly, a principled reading of Fisher and Grutter suggests that the amount of deference
owed to state actors varies between the two prongs of strict scrutiny analysis, with no deference given on the narrow-tailoring
prong but some deference given on the compelling-interest
prong. 197 If this interpretation were applied to the § 2 context,
then courts would give state defendants no deference on the
question whether the state’s remedial plan was narrowly tailored to cure a § 2 violation, but courts would afford some deference on the question whether the state would have been in violation of § 2 but for the remedial plan.
See Fisher, 133 S Ct at 2419–22; Grutter, 539 US at 326–27.
For another modern Supreme Court case addressing the constitutionality of racebased affirmative action in university admissions, see generally Gratz v Bollinger, 539
US 244 (2003). Note that the Court’s discussion in Gratz, unlike in Fisher and Grutter,
neither delves deeply into the compelling-interest prong of strict scrutiny analysis nor
speaks to the amount of deference that courts should give state actors when engaging in
that analysis. Id at 268–75.
195 Fisher, 133 S Ct at 2419–20.
196 Grutter, 539 US at 328. See also id (“The Law School’s educational judgment that
such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.”).
197 For other scholars’ and practitioners’ accounts of the tiered system of deference
emerging from these cases, see, for example, Yifan (Yvonne) C. Everett and Sarah
Hampton Cheatham, Affirmative Action in Education, 15 Geo J Gender & L 219, 232–36
(2014); Scott Warner, Pete Land, and Kendra Berner, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision
in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin: What It Tells Us (and Doesn’t Tell Us) about
the Consideration of Race in College and University Admissions and Other Contexts, 60
Fed Lawyer 48, 50–51, 54–55 (2013).
193
194
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There are several reasons, however, why a court assessing
the merits of a § 2 defense in racial gerrymandering cases
should reject such an approach and instead apply a
nondeferential standard to both prongs of the strict scrutiny
analysis. As an initial matter, whether a state is in violation of
§ 2 is inherently a question of law requiring the application of
legal doctrine to resolve, unlike the question whether a given
university can offer its students a better education by promoting
diversity on campus. 198 Grutter can therefore be distinguished as
inapplicable to the § 2 context because it involved an asserted
compelling interest—the goal of increased diversity—that fundamentally differs from the compelling interest that a state
must assert when raising the § 2 defense. Put differently, the
logic supporting Grutter’s semideferential approach relates to
the fact that universities are better positioned institutionally
than courts are to evaluate student life on campus and ascertain
whether increased diversity would contribute positively to education. 199 The opposite is true in the racial-districting context:
given a set of relevant demographic facts, courts occupy an institutional role and possess legal authority that state actors do not
share to adjudicate whether a challenged district plan unlawfully dilutes votes as a threshold question of law under Gingles—a
doctrinal determination that is pivotal to the § 2 defense’s availability in any given case. 200 Thus, a primary justification for the

198 For a point of comparison, see Johnson, 515 US at 922–23, citing United States v
Nixon, 418 US 683, 704 (1974), Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803),
Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 211 (1962), and Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1, 18 (1958) (applying
separation of powers principles to conclude that it is the province of the courts—to the
exclusion of other government actors—to decide as a matter of law whether a state is in
violation of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act for the purposes of assessing the merits of a § 5
defense). For a more complete discussion of Johnson, see text accompanying notes 95–
105.
199 See Fisher, 133 S Ct at 2419, citing Grutter, 539 US at 328, 330 (“[A] university’s
educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to
which we defer. . . . [T]he decision to pursue the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity . . . is, in substantial measure, an academic judgment to which some,
but not complete, judicial deference is proper.”) (quotation marks omitted).
200 See Johnson, 515 US at 922–23. Notably, current events offer examples of local
officials involved in redistricting disputes who have expressly acknowledged this disparity in institutional competencies and have thus declined to make definitive statements on
the merits of potential § 2 vote dilution claims (or their state law equivalents). See, for
example, Erin Gurewitz, Santa Barbara Exploring Voting Changes (The Daily Nexus,
Mar 3, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ES2U-YYER (discussing a recent settlement in
a vote dilution case arising over an alleged violation of the California Voting Rights Act
in Santa Barbara, California, and reporting a Santa Barbara city attorney’s statement
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use of deference in affirmative action cases like Grutter is wholly
absent from the § 2 context.
Moreover, the Court in Fisher later expressed some ambivalence about the Grutter Court’s semideferential approach. After
discussing the deference that Grutter accorded to universities on
the compelling-interest prong of strict scrutiny analysis, the
Fisher Court noted the disagreement among the justices on this
issue. 201 Further, while it did not overrule this vestige of Grutter,
a majority of the justices in Fisher strongly implied that they
would have been willing to do so had the parties requested such
an overruling. 202 The justices’ apparent lack of commitment to
this aspect of Grutter thus suggests that limiting Grutter to its
facts, instead of transferring its deferential standard to the § 2
context, would be reasonably consistent with recent trends in
the Court’s racial equal protection jurisprudence.
To illustrate the practical consequences that this
nondeferential approach would have, consider the approach taken by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Dickson. 203 In that
case, the court credited the state officials’ § 2 defense on the
grounds that “the General Assembly identified past or present
discrimination with sufficient specificity to justify the creation of
[Voting Rights Act] districts in order to avoid section 2 liability”
and that “the General Assembly, before making its redistricting
decisions, had a strong basis in evidence on which to reach a
conclusion that race-based remedial action was necessary.”204
The court, however, never engaged in its own analysis of the evidentiary record to determine whether the state defendants had
in fact been in violation of § 2. Instead, the court merely listed
the reports, law review articles, and academic studies that the
defendants had offered the trial court in support of their § 2 de-

that “a definitive conclusion on whether or not there was vote dilution [in the challenged
districts] can only be reached after trial”).
201 Fisher, 133 S Ct at 2419. The fractured opinion in Grutter itself evinces this longstanding disagreement: Thomas’s separate opinion in that case directly contradicts the
majority and maintains that universities should be given no deference on the compellinginterest prong of strict scrutiny analysis. Grutter, 539 US at 362–64 (Thomas concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
202 Fisher, 133 S Ct at 2419 (“There is disagreement about whether Grutter was consistent with the principles of equal protection in approving this compelling interest in
diversity. But the parties here do not ask the Court to revisit that aspect of Grutter’s
holding.”) (citations omitted).
203 For a discussion of Dickson, see text accompanying notes 132–37.
204 Dickson, 766 SE2d at 252.
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fense. 205 “[A]ffording near-absolute deference to the General Assembly,” 206 the court then summarily concluded that this documentary corpus sufficed to meet its strong-basis-in-evidence
standard. 207
Thus, while the Dickson court correctly recognized the
availability of the § 2 defense, a careful reading of the United
States Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny jurisprudence indicates
that the Dickson court adopted an erroneous approach to analyzing the defense’s merits by according undue deference to state
actors. If the court had instead applied the correct,
nondeferential approach to its analysis of the § 2 defense, it
would have more rigorously reviewed the record before it and
engaged with the Gingles preconditions to determine for itself
whether the state would have been in violation of § 2 but for the
district plan at issue. This type of searching, nondeferential approach would help to more effectively screen out race-based district plans that cannot be justified by concrete § 2 concerns—
precisely the types of district plans that have most concerned
commentators critical of the Dickson decision. 208
The doctrinal mechanics of this nondeferential approach,
however, are intrinsically framed within strict scrutiny analysis
and thus apply to the merits of the § 2 defense only when raised
against equal protection racial gerrymandering claims. In contrast, the next Section considers the defense’s application when
raised against § 2 vote dilution claims.
2. The § 2 defense vis-à-vis § 2 itself.
Separate from an analysis of the § 2 defense’s application
against racial gerrymandering claims is the question of the defense’s ability to succeed against vote dilution claims brought
under § 2 itself—a question that no litigant has yet raised in
Id at 250–52.
Brief of Election Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Dickson
v Rucho, Docket No 14-839, *2 (US filed Feb 17, 2015) (available on Westlaw at 2015 WL
678181) (“Professors’ Amicus Brief”). This amicus brief was filed in support of a petition
for a writ of certiorari filed by the plaintiffs in Dickson. See generally Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Dickson v Rucho, No 14-839 (US filed Jan 16, 2015). As detailed in note 132,
the United States Supreme Court granted the petition but then remanded the case to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina for reconsideration in light of Alabama Legislative
Black Caucus v Alabama, 2015 US LEXIS 2122 (US). Dickson v Rucho, 2015 WL 223554
(US).
207 See Dickson, 766 SE2d at 252.
208 See Professors’ Amicus Brief at *13–14 (cited in note 206).
205
206
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court. This potential application of the § 2 defense is worthy of
consideration because the defense could theoretically arise
whenever one minority group claims that its members’ votes are
diluted by a district plan that was designed to protect the voting
power of a second minority group.
Outside the courtroom, minority voters in some neighborhoods have indeed raised such claims. Consider, for example, Illinois’s current Congressional District 4, a majority-minority
district designed to avoid the dilution of Latino votes under
§ 2. 209 A map of District 4 and its surrounding districts are depicted below in Figure 3. 210 District 4, appearing in the center of
the map, wraps almost entirely around District 7 and has an
“odd shape” that “resemble[s] a set of earmuffs.” 211
FIGURE 4. CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS NEAR CHICAGO,
ILLINOIS

209 See Committee for a Fair and Balanced Map v Illinois State Board of Elections,
835 F Supp 2d 563, 591–92 (ND Ill 2011) (three-judge panel) (reporting that the Illinois
General Assembly decided to maintain District 4 as a majority-minority Latino district
after receiving expert advice that such a district would be necessary for the state “to protect itself from suit” under § 2).
210 For an original copy of the map shown in Figure 3, see id at 596.
211 John Kanaly, Gutierrez’s Earmuff-Shaped District Creates Uncompetitive Race
(Medill Reports, Oct 18, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/C6BL-FN8A.

82 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW __ (FORTHCOMING)

2015]

Sued If You Do, Sued If You Don’t

6/30/2015 7:03 PM

139

District 4 fragments Chicago’s Chinatown neighborhood,
and some organizations have consequently objected to the district on the grounds that it dilutes Asian American votes in violation of § 2. 212 If voters were to challenge District 4 on this
ground, the state of Illinois could conceivably attempt to use § 2
to defend that the design of District 4 was necessary to avoid the
dilution of Latino votes. In such a case, a court would be faced
with the yet-unanswered question whether § 2 may be raised as
a defense to § 2 vote dilution claims.
Given the doctrinal basis for raising the § 2 defense against
§ 2 claims, 213 the defense would affect a vote dilution case’s outcome only if the case involved demographics that allowed both
the plaintiff and the state to establish the three Gingles preconditions with regard to both the challenged and counterfactual
district plans, respectively. 214 However, in that same subset of
cases, each party’s establishment of the Gingles preconditions
would create a doctrinal stalemate such that a court’s analysis
of the § 2 defense’s merits would necessarily devolve into an unstructured evaluation of § 2’s totality-of-the-circumstances test.
In other words, a court’s ultimate determination of which minority group would be entitled to command a citizen voting-age majority in a contested district would turn solely on historical, sociological, and political information bearing on which of the two
groups had been more negatively affected by racial discrimination
overall
under
the
fact-intensive
totality-of-the215
circumstances inquiry.
This application of the § 2 defense engenders two complications, each lending itself to divergent implications for the § 2 defense’s viability against § 2 vote dilution claims. The first problem is administrative: in the case of a conflict between two
groups that have both historically been considered minorities in
the United States, it may be far from clear—both for states hoping to avoid legal disputes and for the courts charged with resolving them—which conclusions a court should draw from § 2’s
212 See Aricka Flowers, Minority Groups: Illinois Redistricting Maps “Unfair” (Progress Illinois, May 31, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/7YYW-QRQX.
213 See text accompanying notes 183–84.
214 See text accompanying note 187.
215 See notes 37–38 and accompanying text (discussing the factors that bear on the
totality-of-the-circumstances test under § 2). Note that this doctrinal equipoise does not
occur when § 2 is raised as a defense against an equal protection racial gerrymandering
claim, because such a case inherently lacks the doctrinal symmetries that would characterize a case in which the § 2 defense were raised against a § 2 vote dilution claim.

82 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW __ (FORTHCOMING)

140

The University of Chicago Law Review

6/30/2015 7:03 PM

[82:NNN

totality-of-the-circumstances test. For example, consider the
facts of De Grandy. 216 In that case, black and Hispanic voters
both alleged that a Floridian district plan had diluted their
votes in violation of § 2. 217 Although the lower court in De
Grandy found that both sets of plaintiffs had independently established prima facie cases of § 2 liability, it nevertheless upheld
the district plan at issue, deferring to the state’s enactment of
the plan on the grounds that it was impossible to fashion a remedy accommodating the interests of both minority groups. 218 If
confronted with competing vote dilution claims in a case in
which a meritorious § 2 defense were raised against a § 2 claim,
a court leaning in the direction of the De Grandy district court’s
approach might find in favor of the state defendants, deferring
to the status quo given the lack of a superior alternative.
The second problem is jurisprudential: In LULAC, the Supreme Court indicated that § 2 should not be interpreted to allow a state to remedy the dilution of one minority group’s votes
at the expense of another’s 219—an interpretation that would be
necessarily implicit in judicial recognition of the ultimate merits
of a § 2 defense. Given this concern, in the subset of vote dilution
cases in which the § 2 defense’s availability would be potentially
outcome determinative, a court might be unwilling to entertain
the § 2 defense at all—even if the same court were willing to
recognize the defense when raised in response to equal protection racial gerrymandering claims.
A thought experiment on a court’s potential resolution of the
vote dilution issues implicated by Illinois’s Congressional District 4 illustrates the tension between these competing administrative and jurisprudential concerns. Imagine that a group of
Asian Americans files a § 2 complaint in federal district court
against Illinois state officials. Imagine further that the officials
defend District 4 by arguing that its creation was necessary to
avoid diluting Latino votes under § 2, and the district court finds
216 For a more complete discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in De Grandy,
see text accompanying notes 49–55.
217 De Grandy, 512 US at 1000–02.
218 See id at 1004 (“The [district court’s] findings of vote dilution in the senatorial
districts had no practical effect . . . because the court held that remedies for the blacks
and the Hispanics were mutually exclusive.”). See also De Grandy v Wetherell, 815 F
Supp 1550, 1580 (ND Fla 1992), affd in part and revd in part, De Grandy, 512 US 997.
219 LULAC, 548 US at 429, citing Shaw II, 517 US at 917. See also Shaw II, 517 US
at 917 (“The vote dilution injuries suffered by [African American § 2 plaintiffs] are not
remedied by creating a safe majority-black district somewhere else in the State.”).
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merit in both the § 2 claim and the § 2 defense. How would the
court resolve the case? On the one hand, the court might follow
the approach taken by the district court in De Grandy, deferring
to the status quo and effectively relying on the merits of Illinois’s § 2 defense to uphold District 4. On the other hand, the
court might find grounds for refusing to consider the § 2 defense’s merits altogether, or for otherwise choosing to strike
down District 4. For example, the court might rely on LULAC as
a basis for declining to recognize the § 2 defense against a § 2
claim, pointing to this precedent for the proposition that state
actors cannot lawfully “make up for the less-than-equal opportunity of some individuals by providing greater opportunity to
others.” 220 Likewise, even a court otherwise inclined to follow the
De Grandy approach might nevertheless strike down District 4 if
it concluded that Illinois could have instead designed a plan that
accommodated both minority groups (such as a plan that included one majority-minority district for Latinos and a separate majority-minority district for Asian Americans).
As this example illustrates, the Court’s vote dilution precedents are mired with contradictory implications for the viability
of the § 2 defense against § 2 claims. At least in this context,
then, the defense’s fate remains uncertain. Ultimately, whether
courts would be willing to recognize the § 2 defense as raised
against § 2 vote dilution claims—as well as how courts would
apply the defense in circumstances in which the totality-of-thecircumstances test failed to yield clear results—are questions
that remain too far on the horizon of future case law to presently
be ripe for resolution.
C. Developing a Districting Strategy in Light of the § 2
Defense
Given the above account of how the § 2 defense might operate in practice, how could a state seeking to avoid a § 2 violation
design its district plan in a way that would avoid liability under
both § 2 and the Equal Protection Clause? Under one reading of
Gingles, a state might attempt to avoid § 2 liability by intentionally creating majority-minority districts. 221 If consequently

LULAC, 548 US at 429 (citation omitted).
See, for example, Vera, 517 US at 993 (O’Connor concurring) (postulating that
§ 2 “may require a State to create a majority-minority district where the three Gingles
factors are present”); Fuentes-Rohwer, 5 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol at 151 (cited in note
220
221
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sued under the Equal Protection Clause for intentionally taking
race into account in remedial districting, the state could then
use § 2 as an affirmative defense, arguing that the plan was
narrowly tailored to further the state’s compelling interest in
avoiding a § 2 violation. 222
However, if sued under § 2 itself for drawing a plan that resulted in vote dilution, the § 2 defense might be unavailable to
offer the state a safe haven from liability. In particular, the defense’s availability will depend on courts’ willingness to consider
the defense in the context of § 2 vote dilution cases. 223 As such,
the creation of majority-minority districts may not be an entirely
foolproof means of remedying a district plan that violates § 2.
Furthermore, some scholars have expressed a concern that, to
the extent that states rely on an interpretation of § 2 that mandates the creation of majority-minority districts, the current Supreme Court may be poised to strike down § 2 as irredeemably
at odds with the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore unconstitutional. 224
Instead, states can avoid and remedy § 2 violations by creating coalitional districts in which “minority voters make up less
than a majority of the voting-age population” but are still large
enough in number to “elect the candidate[s] of [their] choice with
help from voters who are members of the majority and who cross
over to support the minority’s preferred candidate.” 225 The critical feature of coalitional districts is that they can protect a state
from liability under § 2 by entirely precluding plaintiffs from es177) (noting that the Voting Rights Act may be “deployed in furtherance of majorityminority districts”).
222 See text accompanying notes 185–87.
223 See text accompanying notes 216–20.
224 See Fuentes-Rohwer, 5 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol at 142–43 (cited in note 177);
Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 Harv L Rev
1663, 1735–36 (2001).
225 Strickland, 556 US at 13 (Kennedy) (plurality). Of course, from a pragmatic
standpoint, whether it is logistically possible for a state to create coalitional districts
may be limited by the extent to which voting is racially polarized in the relevant geographic area. See Note, The Future of Majority-Minority Districts in Light of Declining
Racially Polarized Voting, 116 Harv L Rev 2208, 2224–25 (2003) (explaining that a legislature’s ability to create coalitional districts depends on “polarized voting [ ] declin[ing]
to the point that minority voters have an ‘equal opportunity’ to elect their preferred candidates in coalitional districts”). Empirical evidence suggests that racially polarized voting is declining and that the creation of coalitional districts is therefore becoming increasingly possible. See Pildes, 80 NC L Rev at 1529 (cited in note 145) (“[W]hile voting
continues to show some degree of racial polarization, the degree of polarization nonetheless permits a meaningful level of white-black coalitional politics.”).
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tablishing a prima facie case of vote dilution. This is because
plaintiffs who challenge coalitional districts as resulting in vote
dilution will be systematically unable to establish the third
Gingles precondition, which requires plaintiffs to show that the
majority group in a given geographic region votes as a bloc to defeat the minority group’s preferred candidate. 226 In other words,
although § 2 does not formally require states to draw coalitional
districts, 227 the creation of coalitional districts is an effective
strategy for foreclosing the risk of § 2 liability altogether.
A race-conscious districting strategy focused on the creation
of coalitional districts would stave off the risk of equal protection
liability as well. First, though a state must consider race in the
course of creating a racially integrated coalitional district, it
may be able to block plaintiffs from establishing a prima facie
racial gerrymandering claim by arguing that voters’ cross racial
political affiliations—not race itself—predominantly informed a
challenged coalitional district’s design. 228 Equal protection precedents show that courts are indeed willing to dismiss claims alleging racial gerrymandering if a state defendant can show that
political rather than racial considerations predominated a challenged district’s design, even when racial considerations entered
into the design’s calculus. 229 Second, even if a court were to allow
a plaintiff’s prima facie equal protection claim to stand, a state
defendant could still attempt to avoid an adverse judgment by
availing itself of the § 2 defense. 230 In this way, the creation of
coalitional districts constitutes a workable reconciliation of the
otherwise-conflicting obligations that § 2 and the Equal Protection Clause impose on state governments.
Moreover, the creation of coalitional districts to avoid § 2 violations is an approach that seven justices strongly endorsed in
Strickland, an otherwise highly fractured decision. Writing for
the plurality, for example, Justice Kennedy stressed that “§ 2 allows States to choose their own method of complying with the
Voting Rights Act, and [the Court has] said that may include
drawing crossover districts.” He further advanced that “states
See Gingles, 478 US at 50–51.
See Strickland, 556 US at 23–25 (Kennedy) (plurality).
228 See Johnson, 515 US at 916.
229 See, for example, Easley v Cromartie, 532 US 234, 243–44, 257–58 (2001) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim that racial considerations predominated the design of a North
Carolina district plan, on the grounds that the design was instead predominated by political considerations).
230 See text accompanying notes 185–87.
226
227
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could draw crossover districts as they deemed appropriate” to
remedy § 2 violations. 231 Justice David Souter, the author of
Strickland’s principal dissent, similarly encouraged the creation
of coalitional districts and praised the ability of such districts to
“vindicate the interest expressly protected by § 2.” 232 This broad
endorsement of the coalitional-district approach countervails
concerns that Strickland requires the creation of majorityminority districts to the exclusion of coalitional districts. 233
D. Taking Stock: In Defense of the Defense
Thus far, this Part has undertaken a thorough legal analysis of the availability and potential merits of the § 2 defense.
Namely, it has examined the legal basis for judicial recognition
of the § 2 defense, constructed an analytical framework for evaluating the defense’s merits, and envisioned how the defense’s
availability might impact state officials’ districting choices.
There remains, however, a yet-unexamined baseline question:
As a normative matter, why should the law ever permit state officials to engage in race-conscious districting?
Government action based on racial classifications has rarely
played an admirable role in American history. 234 Accordingly, to
the extent that § 2 is in tension with the Equal Protection
Clause’s prohibition against “invidious discrimination,” 235 one
might contend that it should not be tolerated as the basis of a
judicially cognizable defense against claims of racial districting.
After all, in the words of Roberts, “[i]t is a sordid business, this
divvying [ ] up by race.” 236
However, an interpretation of § 2 that allows room for raceconscious districting is normatively defensible in spite of this objection. As an initial matter, judicial acceptance of the defense
may be the only way to reconcile the Voting Rights Act—widely
hailed as one of the greatest triumphs of the civil rights movement—with the Equal Protection Clause. Importantly, this attempt at reconciliation is motivated by more than just a desire
Strickland, 556 US at 23–24 (Kennedy) (plurality).
Id at 32 (Souter dissenting).
233 See text accompanying notes 157–59.
234 See generally, for example, David F. Ericson, Slavery in the American Republic:
Developing the Federal Government, 1791–1861 (Kansas 2011).
235 LULAC, 548 US at 461 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part).
236 Id at 511 (Roberts concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
231
232
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to offer states a way out of the “impossible position” 237 that they
face when deciding whether and how to comply with § 2. Rather,
the reconciliation is ultimately also driven by the recognition
that both the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause
have generated positive results for the development of American
race relations over time. The Voting Rights Act is “widely considered one of the most effective instruments of social legislation
in the modern era of American reform.” 238 Likewise, flexible,
adaptive interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause’s scope
have been celebrated by scholars as essential to the social progress that occurred over the course of the twentieth century.239
These two sources of law must be made compatible with one another if they are to continue advancing race relations in the future.
Moreover, the availability of the § 2 defense, while permitting race-conscious state action to a limited extent, may
counterintuitively have the effect of decreasing racial polarization in electoral districts by incentivizing states to focus on creating coalitional districts in place of majority-minority districts. 240 Besides having the practical advantage over majorityminority districts of more effectively protecting states from liability, coalitional districts are normatively superior because they
downplay rather than emphasize racial polarization in voter
preferences and reduce the extent to which political campaigns
make targeted racial appeals. 241
In addition to these effects-based arguments, scholars have
advanced a variety of moral and political arguments in support
of remedial race-conscious government action generally. For example, scholars have defended such remedial action on moral
grounds by arguing that it is neither motivated by “invidious
discriminatory animus” nor “as pervasive or as ingrained in the
Id at 518 (Scalia concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Jason Rathod, A Post-racial Voting Rights Act, 13 Berkeley J Afr Am L & Pol
139, 159 (2011) (quotation marks omitted).
239 See, for example, Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 Va L Rev
951, 958 (2002).
240 See Part III.C.
241 See Strickland, 556 US at 34–35 (Souter dissenting) (“A crossover is thus superior to a majority-minority district precisely because it requires polarized factions to break
out of the mold and form the coalitions that discourage racial divisions.”); Rathod, 13
Berkeley J Afr Am L & Pol at 191–93 (cited in note 238) (criticizing the creation of majority-minority districts because they “create environments obsessed with race,” “reward
race-baiting candidates and punish post-racial candidates,” and “elect candidates who
lack the cross-racial appeal to win statewide races”).
237
238
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social fabric” as compared to historical examples of overt racial
discrimination. 242 Remedial race-conscious action also contributes positively to the public-policy goals of attaining political
advancement for minorities and “eradicat[ing] [ ] debilitating
stereotypes” over the long term. 243 In turn, scholars have further
argued that the advancement of these goals comports with the
pluralist-democratic vision that lies at the core of the nation’s
founding—a vision that “treats as primary the values of including all members of the polity and treating them as equal,
coparticipants in constructing the fundamental values of the polity.” 244
Thus, in addition to the legal grounds for judicial recognition of the § 2 defense, there exists strong normative support for
the defense’s recognition from pragmatic, consequentialist, moral, and political perspectives. The open question for the future,
then, is not whether courts can or should begin to acknowledge
the § 2 defense, but whether they will in fact rise to the occasion
and begin to implement it in the courtroom—and if so, when.
CONCLUSION
This Comment addresses the legal and historical bases that
states may use to deploy § 2 of the Voting Rights Act as a defense against claims challenging district plans as racially discriminatory. In addition to the doctrinal support that exists for
judicial recognition of the § 2 defense, normative reasoning also
indicates that it is imperative that states have the § 2 defense at
their disposal. Absent the defense’s availability, states have no
legally cognizable means of taking proactive measures to avoid
or remedy a potential § 2 violation.
After arguing in support of the § 2 defense’s availability,
this Comment also considers how courts would apply the § 2 defense in practice. It advocates for a regime in which courts evaluating the merits of the defense in the equal protection context
would not grant deference to state legislatures’ determinations
242 Roy L. Brooks, The Affirmative Action Issue: Law, Policy, and Morality, 22 Conn
L Rev 323, 353 (1990).
243 Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action
Debate, 99 Harv L Rev 1327, 1329 (1986).
244 Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion: Reconceptualizing the Role of
the Judge in a Pluralist Polity, 58 Md L Rev 150, 207 (1999). For arguments that remedial race-conscious government action plays a role in advancing pluralist-democratic
ideals, see id at 249–67; Brooks, 22 Conn L Rev at 367 (cited in note 242).
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of whether a given district plan was necessary and narrowly tailored to avoid a § 2 violation. Finally, and perhaps of most practical import, this Comment calls on states to create coalitional
districts as a means of avoiding violations of both § 2 and the
Equal Protection Clause. In combination, judicial recognition of
the § 2 defense and states’ reactive creation of coalitional districts would help to “hasten the waning of racism in American
politics”—the ultimate ideal of § 2 itself. 245

245

1020.

Strickland, 556 US at 25 (Kennedy) (plurality), quoting De Grandy, 512 US at
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